The Supreme Judicial Court heard arguments in Commonwealth v. Sherry Maria Dobson over whether police improperly obtained consent to search a locked glove compartment after a traffic stop for tinted windows, defense counsel Kevin Sandorski told the court. Sandorski told the justices that multiple pat-frisks, ongoing custodial questioning without Miranda warnings and threats to damage the car coerced Dobson into handing over her keys, which led to a canine alert and the subsequent search.

The issue matters because the court must decide whether the glove-compartment search — and evidence discovered as a result — should be suppressed. If the court finds the consent was involuntary or that the stop was improperly extended before canine or probable-cause justification, suppression could affect the Commonwealth’s case against Dobson.

At argument, Sandorski outlined a sequence of events recorded on police video: officers stopped Dobson’s vehicle for tinted windows; officers observed what one described as a passenger making a furtive movement toward the center console and glove compartment; both passengers were ordered out of the car and frisked; the glove compartment was locked; officers conducted repeated pat-frisks of the defendant; and a police canine later alerted to the glove compartment. Sandorski argued that the cumulative effect of those actions — repeated pat-frisks that yielded nothing, “barking orders,” threats that the car would be damaged if she did not surrender the keys, and continuous custodial questioning without Miranda warnings — rendered any subsequent handing over of keys involuntary. “They essentially coerced Miss Dobson into giving the keys to the police,” Sandorski said.

Sandorski urged the court to treat the conduct as an on-site, continuing illegality relevant to both the voluntariness and attenuation inquiries. He argued that, even if individual pat-frisks did not produce evidence, their repetitive and intrusive character, taken together with custodial questioning and threats to damage the car, meant the later consent could not be considered the product of free and voluntary choice.

The Commonwealth, represented by Darcy Jordan, countered that Dobson engaged in a prolonged “game of keep away” with her keys, prolonging the encounter. Jordan emphasized the officers’ stated observations — furtive gestures toward the glove compartment, the stop’s location in an area the officers associated with gang activity, and the role of tinted windows as a possible mechanism to conceal contraband — and contended those facts supported a lawful escalation of investigation. “This is really about the defendant’s prolonged game of keep away,” Jordan told the court.

Justices pressed both sides on discrete legal questions. The bench asked whether probable cause or exigent circumstances existed before the canine alert, whether the canine hit rendered later consent irrelevant under inevitable-discovery or automobile-exception doctrines, and whether suppression remains an appropriate remedy if probable cause existed independent of the challenged conduct. Counsel and the justices discussed case law the parties invoked (defense cited Martin and Rodriguez and an appeals decision identified as Farnsworth), the interplay between Miranda warnings and consent-to-search analysis, and how courts should evaluate attenuation when alleged illegality consists principally of on-site, repeated intrusive conduct rather than a discrete earlier exploitation of discovered evidence.

Counsel and the court also disputed timing and sequence details relevant to voluntariness: defense counsel described the overall stop as “about 20 minutes,” said the canine arrived within that range, and noted a roughly five-minute interval between a last pressuring exchange and the defendant’s handing over of keys, arguing the several minutes of sustained pressure were relevant to voluntariness. The Commonwealth emphasized earlier moments in the encounter (furtive movements, the passenger’s reactions, and officers’ safety concerns) to justify continued detention and questioning.

Neither side asked the justices for immediate oral ruling; the exchange was argument-focused. The issues the court identified for resolution include whether the pat-frisks and custodial questioning prior to surrendering keys were lawful and, if not, whether the later canine alert and any independent probable cause render suppression inappropriate.

The justices did not announce a decision at the argument. A written opinion resolving whether the search and any evidence recovered must be suppressed will follow.