The Michigan Supreme Court heard argument Tuesday in People v. Robinson on whether the circuit court ever acquired subject-matter jurisdiction when an indictment initiating the case was issued by a judge acting under one-person grand-jury statutes and the case proceeded without a preliminary examination and bind over.

Harold Gerwitz, attorney for Todd Robinson, told the court that "the answer to the question we submit is properly no. There was no subject matter jurisdiction." Gerwitz argued the circuit court lacked authority because the statute authorizing the judge's action provides no power to indict and because the state constitution's separation-of-powers provision bars a judge from acting in a prosecutorial capacity. He said statutory and court-rule prerequisites — typically a preliminary examination or a proper bind over — were not satisfied here.

Gerwitz framed the dispute as a "vertical" subject-matter jurisdiction question: whether the circuit court ever obtained authority to hear the case. He relied on prior decisions including Washington and Peeler, and urged that where a judge lacks authority to bring charges, the proper remedy is dismissal rather than an exercise of jurisdiction.

Representing the people, Matt Way of the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office urged the court to adhere to precedent distinguishing defects in the exercise of jurisdiction from true defects in subject-matter jurisdiction. "Errors in exercise of jurisdiction, no matter how grave, cannot be attacked collaterally," Way said, arguing the Court of Appeals properly applied that precedent and that the circuit court acquired jurisdiction once an information alleging a felony was filed. Way said practical consequences counsel caution: he estimated roughly "between 10 and 15" such proceedings occurred in his county and that Wayne County reported "no less than 200," and warned that ruling for the defendant could force retrials or raise double-jeopardy concerns for people previously acquitted.

The arguments turned on statutory interpretation of the one-person grand-jury provisions (referred to in argument as sections 767.3 and 767.4) and whether the historical legislative record and case law support treating an indictment issued by a judge as a jurisdictional defect rather than a procedural one. Way pointed to decisions such as Jackson City Bank v. Frederick and Ferrante to support the view that a later-filed charging document (an information) can supply subject-matter jurisdiction. Gerwitz countered that where a judge acts as a prosecutor the separation-of-powers issue and the absence of prescribed preliminary procedures mean jurisdiction never attached.

Justices questioned both counsel about the practical scope and precedent implications, including whether the court's prior opinions created a new rule of law or merely clarified existing doctrine. Gerwitz acknowledged the significance for Robinson and noted the case implicates foundational questions about who may initiate felony prosecutions. Way emphasized that the court's precedents and federal authority limit jurisdictional rulings to the most serious constitutional defects.

After argument, the court submitted the case for decision. No opinion or vote was announced at the hearing.