The Michigan Supreme Court heard oral argument in People v. Morgan over whether the blood-alcohol content of a crash victim may be admitted at trial to show a superseding intervening cause in a fatal U-turn collision.

The question centers on whether the decedent’s possible intoxication—described in briefing as ranging from a measured postmortem BAC of 0.059 up to an extrapolated 0.081—combined with alleged high speed, is admissible under the court’s Feasel balancing test or properly excluded under Michigan Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. Defense counsel argued the combination of alcohol and speed could permit a jury to find the victim’s conduct severed the causal chain; the prosecutor urged the trial court correctly barred the BAC as insufficient to raise gross negligence and suggested further factual development or remand.

Defense counsel told the justices that Michael Morgan executed a “safe and legal U-turn on Kensington Road,” and that the crash victim “took off like a bat,” exceeding the unposted 55 mph speed limit and reaching as much as 75 mph in rush-hour traffic. Counsel argued that, under the totality of the circumstances required by Feasel, the victim’s alcohol level was relevant because impairment increases reaction time; counsel cited expert testimony (Kevin Armstrong) estimating typical traffic flow at 35–45 mph and theoretical stopping-distance calculations that, counsel said, make impairment at high speed dispositive. Counsel also referenced a toxicology extrapolation and told the court that Dr. Henson would explain alcohol absorption and elimination rates to support the defense’s inferences about possible higher BAC at the time of the crash.

The prosecutor, Caitlin Kurbout, argued the trial court correctly applied Feasel and excluded the decedent’s BAC because the record did not show Mr. Donald Arnold’s driving rose to the level of gross negligence required to present a jury question that the decedent was a superseding cause. Kurbout told the court the available evidence indicated Arnold was “driving within his own lane of travel on a sunny afternoon during rush hour” and that the defendant introduced the hazard by turning into Arnold’s lane. She urged the court to deny leave to appeal or, in the alternative, to remand for further factual development, including a Daubert hearing on the defense’s BAC extrapolation.

Several justices questioned both sides about the legal distinction between admitting BAC as part of an affirmative prosecution theory (for example, reckless driving or OWI-related charges) and admitting it as a defense or mitigation argument. One justice asked why speed and BAC together should be treated differently if courts have held that intoxication or speeding alone ordinarily do not establish gross negligence. Defense counsel replied that the magnitude of the speed (75 mph in the defense’s account) combined with impairment can support a finding of wantonness and disregard for consequences, making the evidence both relevant and admissible for a jury to consider once the judge finds gross negligence is “in issue.”

Kurbout acknowledged competing speed estimates in the record and told the court the trial judge permitted evidence about speed for credibility determinations by the jury, but concluded there was insufficient evidence at that stage to permit the decedent’s BAC. She emphasized the factual specificity of such admissibility questions and noted the prosecution’s concern that the defense’s extrapolated BAC and speed estimates rested at “extreme ranges” not yet vetted by a Daubert process.

Neither side asked the Supreme Court to issue a broad, bright-line rule; the prosecutor specifically proposed remand to expand the record rather than a precedential ruling. At argument’s close, the court submitted the case.

The court’s discussion focused narrowly on evidentiary standards—Feasel, MRE 401 and 403, and the Daubert inquiry—and did not resolve the underlying factual disputes (competing speed estimates; whether signs of impairment in Mr. Arnold’s driving existed). The justices’ questioning made clear they considered both the legal gatekeeping function of the trial judge and the jury’s role in resolving factual disputes if evidence is admitted.

The case was submitted for decision and the court adjourned.