The Supreme Judicial Court heard argument in Commonwealth v. Donta L. Lewis on whether the phrase "separate incidences" in section 10 g of the armed career criminal statute requires that prior convictions be finally sentenced before they can count as separate prior incidents for enhanced punishment.

Assistant District Attorney Bryn Morris, arguing for the Commonwealth, told the court, "May it please the court, ADA Bryn Morris on behalf of the Commonwealth asking this court to reverse." Morris said Rezende reached a correct outcome for the facts in that case but contained language the Commonwealth characterized as dicta and inconsistent with the plain text of section 10 g. Morris argued the armed career criminal statute focuses on a defendant's status "at the moment when you possess a firearm," so separate charges brought between incidents and prosecuted separately should be treated as separate incidences; the Commonwealth also contrasted the state statute with the federal Armed Career Criminal Act and with habitual-offender or subsequent-offender statutes that, Morris said, are structured differently.

Defense counsel Patrick Levin urged the court to read Rezende as controlling. "What the what the opinion says is that the prior conviction and imposition of sentence has to precede the commission of the next crime," Levin told the justices, arguing that Rezende's emphasis on a defendant having an opportunity to reform—what Levin described as the recidivist philosophy—supports treating some clustered offenses as part of a single incidence. Levin said the statute's structure and the court's prior reasoning indicate ambiguity that favors the defendant under the rule of lenity.

Justices pressed both sides on whether the contested language in Rezende was dicta and whether stare decisis factors would permit overruling. An unidentified justice asked, "So you're asking us to overrule Resende?" The Commonwealth responded that reversal of Rezende is unnecessary if the court adopts the Commonwealth's narrower reading, but left overruling as an option if the court deems it warranted. Levin cautioned that stare decisis typically applies strongly in statutory interpretation and emphasized that the Rezende opinion explained its reasoning by reference to the statute's structure and related authorities.

Argument touched on several concrete points the justices explored: how Rezende treated a set of drug transactions charged together within a short period (noted in argument as occurring over a 17-day span), whether the statutory language "incidences" means separate acts or refers to a broader notion of incidence (frequency or occurrence), and whether federal analogues or joinder rules (Rule 9 joinder was discussed) should inform interpretation. Levin pointed to Rezende's factual record—predicates that were all serious drug offenses and resolved together—and argued that the court's holding flowed from that record. The Commonwealth emphasized scenarios in which a defendant is charged and sentenced between offenses, arguing that such intervening proceedings mark clear separations between incidences.

Neither side identified statutory text beyond repeated references to "section 10 g" and to the statute's graduated structure discussed at argument (counsel cited mandatory minimum ranges associated with 1, 2 and 3 prior offenses during questioning). Both counsel acknowledged the potential policy consequences of different readings: Levin warned that construing "incidences" too broadly would undercut the statute's recidivist purpose (specific deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation), while the Commonwealth warned that a narrow reading could incentivize prosecution strategies that avoid global resolution and thereby affect charging and plea practices.

The court did not announce a decision during argument. Counsel for both sides asked the court to rule in their favor—Morris asked for reversal of the lower-court result, Levin asked for affirmation of Rezende's application—and questions from the bench focused on statutory meaning, precedent, joinder, and the proper role of stare decisis in statutory interpretation.

The dispute before the court turns on textual interpretation of "separate incidences," the precedential weight of Rezende's language beyond its central holding, and the consequences a ruling would have for when prior convictions count toward enhanced armed-career sentencing.