The Arizona Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that a defense attorney’s near-total failure to communicate a prosecution plea offer can implicate a constitutional right so personal that a defendant must personally, knowingly and voluntarily waive any related post-conviction claim. Justice Montgomery, writing for the court, affirmed the superior court’s finding for petitioner Michael Eugene Traverso and remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings.

The ruling matters because it limits when post-conviction courts may bar successive ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims on preclusion grounds under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3), and it clarifies that a lawyer’s failure to convey plea terms that would affect a defendant’s decision to waive a jury is of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” to require the defendant’s personal waiver, the court said.

In the underlying criminal case, Traverso was indicted in 2006 on six counts of sexual conduct with a minor and one count of public sexual indecency to a minor. The State twice or more offered a plea providing a stipulated sentence range of 13 to 27 years; the transcript and the opinion note that the total exposure if convicted of all counts consecutively could reach 163.5 years. Trial counsel did not communicate the offer to Traverso until the day before it expired and did not explain that the counts could run consecutively; counsel described the offer as “outrageous,” according to the opinion. A judge later advised Traverso on the record about the offer and Traverso stated he rejected it and said, “I’m innocent.” After trial, a jury convicted Traverso and the court imposed consecutive terms resulting in a 79.5-year sentence.

Traverso filed a timely post-conviction relief (PCR) notice in 2009 raising several IAC claims. His initial PCR counsel, the opinion states, discussed the plea-offer facts with Traverso but did not present them as a separate IAC claim in the filed petition. Traverso filed a successive PCR notice in 2020 asserting the plea-offer IAC claim; the superior court granted relief, set aside the conviction, and ordered the State to re-offer the plea agreement. The court of appeals reversed in part, and the State sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

Justice Montgomery wrote that Stewart v. Smith’s language suggesting automatic preclusion of successive IAC claims was inconsistent with Rule 32’s current text and the 2020 amendments to the rule. “We therefore disavow the preclusion language in paragraph 12 of Stewart,” the opinion states. Instead, the court held that whether an IAC claim is precluded depends on whether the alleged deficient performance affected a right of sufficient constitutional magnitude so that the defendant personally must have waived it in a prior PCR petition.

Applying that principle to Traverso’s case, the court held that the right at issue was not a generalized “right to a plea bargain,” but a defendant’s right to be sufficiently informed of an existing plea offer so the defendant could decide whether to plead guilty and thereby waive a jury trial. The court said effective assistance at the plea stage is “just as necessary” as at trial and quoted precedent that a defendant is entitled to competent counsel during plea negotiations. The court concluded that an IAC claim based on counsel’s “woefully inadequate communication of a plea offer” implicates a constitutionally protected, personal right and therefore falls within Rule 32.2(a)(3)’s exception to preclusion.

The Supreme Court also affirmed the superior court’s finding that Traverso adequately explained why his 2020 successive PCR notice was untimely. The superior court had found that delays from extensive state and federal litigation and the time current counsel needed to evaluate the record and prepare the successive petition explained the timing; the Supreme Court said the superior court did not abuse its discretion in that factual determination.

The opinion vacated paragraphs 9–23 of the court of appeals’ 2023 opinion (256 Ariz. 278 (App. 2023)) and remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of remaining issues the court had not addressed. The Supreme Court explicitly said it expressed no view on the merits of Traverso’s IAC claim.

The opinion also included an admonition to trial courts and practitioners. To facilitate later review, Justice Montgomery suggested trial courts should ensure the record reflects any off-the-record discussions about plea negotiations and that Donald advisements address whether defendants have discussed the offer with counsel, understand the sentencing consequences of conviction at trial, and have reviewed the constitutional rights they may waive by pleading guilty.

The case caption is State of Arizona v. Michael Eugene Traverso, No. CR-23-0264-PR, opinion filed Sept. 23, 2025. The opinion was authored by Justice Montgomery and joined by Chief Justice Timmer, Vice Chief Justice Lopez, and Justices Bolick, Beene, King and Pelander (Ret.). The opinion cites, among others, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a), 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(b)(3)(D); State v. Donald; State v. Diaz; Stewart v. Smith; and United States Supreme Court decisions including Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye.

What happens next: the case returns to the court of appeals for further consideration consistent with the Supreme Court’s instructions; the Supreme Court’s ruling leaves untouched the question whether Traverso ultimately obtains relief on the merits of his IAC claim.